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The Sound of Silence: 
What Do We Know When Insiders Do Not Trade? 
 
 
Abstract 
 
We examine the phenomenon of insider silence, periods when corporate insiders 
do not trade. Our evidence strongly supports the jeopardy hypothesis that 
regulations inhibit insiders from trading on extreme information, implying a 
relation between insider silence and extreme future returns. First, insiders of 
merger targets refrain from buying in the months before the merger 
announcement, and insiders of bankruptcy firms refrain from selling before the 
bankruptcy filing. Second, among firms that are likely to have bad news, insider 
silence predicts significant negative future returns, which are even lower than 
when insiders net sell. Further, the negative information in insider silence is 
gradually incorporated into stock prices, and a significant portion of it is released 
around quarterly earnings announcements. Finally, the price inefficiency due to 
insider silence is pervasive, and market frictions make it worse.   
 
Keywords: Insider trading; Insider silence; Short interest; Price efficiency; Limits 
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1. Introduction 
Previous work demonstrates that corporate insider trading appears to be informative—the 
stocks insiders buy tend to subsequently outperform those insiders sell.
1
 Corporate insiders such 
as officers and directors, however, do not trade frequently. For example, in 33% of the U.S. firms 
insiders do not trade over a half-year horizon (see Panel A of Figure 1 in detail). There are at 
least two possible reasons for this phenomenon of insider silence (no trading). Obviously, 
insiders do not trade when they have no information to trade on (see Grossman and Stiglitz, 
1980; Kyle, 1985). Somehow counterintuitive, however, insiders may choose not to trade when 
they have extreme information. This is because insider trading is regulated and in general trading 
on material, nonpublic information is illegal.
2
 Therefore, insiders avoid trading when the 
information asymmetry is large. In the former case, insider silence means no information. In the 
latter case, however, insider silence can be associated with extreme information.
3
   
In this paper, we propose and test a jeopardy hypothesis, which posits that due to 
regulations, insiders refrain from trading their own company stocks while possessing extreme 
information, implying a relation between insider silence and extreme future stock returns, either 
positive or negative. The hypothesis can also be viewed as a direct implication of DeMarzo, 
Fishman, and Hagerty (1998), who theorize that the optimal enforcement of insider trading 
regulations follows large trading volumes or large price movements or both. Insiders caught 
trading large volumes are assessed the maximum penalty while small trades are not penalized. 
Under such an enforcement policy, insiders do not trade on extreme information. 
Since the jeopardy hypothesis relates insider silence to both extremely positive and 
extremely negative future returns, testing the hypothesis on a pooled sample is ineffective. This 
is because a combination of extremely positive returns and extremely negative returns in a 
pooled sample is attenuated toward zero. We adopt two approaches in our empirical design. The 
                                                          
1
 See, for example, Seyhun, 1986, 1998; Lakonishok and Lee, 2001; Piotroski and Roulstone, 2005; Marin and 
Olivier, 2008; Sias and Whidbee, 2010; Purnanandam and Seyhun, 2011; Cohen, Malloy, and Pomorski, 2012. 
2
 For a recent example on the costs of trading on inside information, see the following news from Bloomberg. 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-06-01/ex-consol-energy-executives-sued-by-sec-over-insider-trading.html. 
3
 It is worth noting that this phenomenon of insider silence differs from the no-trade outcome as in Milgrom and 
Stokey (1982), who theorize that in a noiseless rational market under the assumption of common knowledge, 
investors do not trade even when they have information. This no-trade-theorem refers to a phenomenon of no 
trading by anyone in a noiseless rational world. In the insider silence phenomenon we examine only insiders as a 
group do not trade for a period of time, but the total trading volume in the market is not necessarily zero. The no-
trade-theorem does not hold when the assumptions are relaxed. For example, when liquidity (or noise) traders are 
allowed, trade occurs (Kyle, 1985; Glosten and Milgrom, 1984; De Long, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldman, 1990). 
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first approach relies on ex-post corporate events that are unequivocally pertaining to extreme 
information. We choose two extreme events: merger offers and bankruptcy filing. Merger offers 
represent a clean signal of extremely positive information while bankruptcy filing is the opposite. 
For the sample of merger offers, the jeopardy hypothesis implies that insiders of merger targets 
refrain from buying their own company shares in the months leading to the public announcement 
of the merger deal. Further, this pattern of no buying prior to a merger offer should be more 
pronounced for targets in friendly deals than in hostile deals. This is because insiders of targets 
in friendly deals have been involved in the private negotiation process and have been aware of 
the upcoming deal announcement. By contrast, it is less likely that insiders of targets in hostile 
deals have foreknowledge of an upcoming takeover offer. For the sample of bankruptcy firms, 
the jeopardy hypothesis predicts that insiders refrain from selling their own company shares 
before the bankruptcy filing.  
For a large sample of mergers announced between 1992 and 2010, we find strong 
evidence supporting the jeopardy hypothesis. Specifically, the proportion of targets whose 
insiders net buy their own company shares is around 8%-10% during the time period at least six 
months before the announcement month. This proportion then decreases to only about 3% in the 
announcement month. Further, this pattern of decreased proportion of targets whose insiders net 
buy exists only in the subsample of friendly deals. Likewise, for a sample of firms that filed 
bankruptcy during 1992-2010, we find that the proportion of bankruptcy firms whose insiders net 
sell starts to drop from about 10% in the 30
th
 month to about 5% right before the filing month. 
Our second approach relies on an ex-ante signal, specifically short interest, to separate 
firms with extremely positive information from firms with extremely negative information. The 
recent growing literature on short selling provides overwhelmingly convincing evidence that 
short investors are informed about firm-specific information, especially negative information, 
and that short selling flows and short interest predict future stock returns (see Section 2 for 
detailed discussion). Thus, firms that are heavily shorted are more likely to have negative 
information and firms that are lightly shorted are more likely to have positive information.  
This empirical setting allows us to entertain three testable implications of the jeopardy 
hypothesis. First, among firms whose insiders have negative information, insider silence predicts 
negative future returns, which are even lower than when insiders are net sellers. Second, among 
firms whose insiders have positive information, insider silence predicts positive future returns, 
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which are even higher than when insiders are net buyers. Third, if keeping silent protects insiders 
from regulatory and legal action against them, insiders should have abstained from trading for a 
longer time period if the information is more extreme. Thus, a longer period of insider silence is 
associated with even more extreme returns.  
Using short interest to separate firms with positive information from firms with negative 
information, we find strong evidence supporting the jeopardy hypothesis, particularly among 
firms with negative information. Specifically, we first rank stocks into quintiles based on their 
short interest. Among the stocks in the top quintile (firms with negative information), we 
establish the following four results.
4
 First, a ―silence‖ portfolio that consists of stocks whose 
insiders have not traded within the past six months experiences subsequent negative abnormal 
returns. This return predictability persists up to 24 months. For example, the average one-year 
buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) of the ―silence‖ portfolio is a significant –7.3%. By 
contrast, a ―sell‖ portfolio that consists of stocks whose insiders have net sold within the past six 
months only experiences moderate, short-lived negative returns in the future. The return 
difference between the ―silence‖ and ―sell‖ portfolios is significantly negative and its magnitude 
grows with the holding period.   
Second, among firms in the top short interest quintile, a longer period of silence is 
associated with even lower abnormal returns. To illustrate, when insiders have been silent for 
one month (that is, insiders have not traded over the previous month but have traded prior to 
that), the one-year BHAR is an insignificant -0.79%.  By contrast, when insiders have been silent 
for 12 months or longer, the one-year BHAR is a significant -9.95%.  
Third, insider silence information is only gradually incorporated into stock prices. We 
show this point through monthly Fama-French-Carhart four-factor alphas and monthly average 
returns surrounding earnings announcements. The monthly four-factor alphas of an equal-weight 
―silence‖ portfolio gradually decay over a 12-month holding period. The alphas of a value-
weight ―silence‖ portfolio exhibit a similar pattern. The abnormal returns surrounding the 
earnings announcements in the months following portfolio formation are significantly negative 
for the ―silence‖ portfolio, and are significantly lower than those of the ―sell‖ portfolio. In 
                                                          
4
 There is no evidence supporting the jeopardy hypothesis among firms in the bottom short interest quintile (firms 
with positive information). This is probably because the good news contained in low short interest is not extreme 
enough to trigger insiders’ concern about legal jeopardy. Our evidence on merger offers suggests that when the 
private information is sufficiently extreme insiders refrain from trading to avoid regulatory and legal action. 
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addition, these negative earnings announcement returns of the ―silence‖ portfolio account for a 
large portion of the monthly alphas, indicating that earnings announcements are an important 
channel through which information in insider silence is incorporated into stock prices. Consistent 
with the ―bad news travels slowly‖ story in Hong and Stein (1999), our evidence indicates that 
investors underreact to insider silence information and are systematically surprised when firm-
specific (negative) news is released through earnings announcements. 
Finally, the price inefficiency due to insider silence is pervasive, and market frictions 
such as limits to arbitrage and information uncertainty make it even worse. We use ten proxies 
for limits to arbitrage or information uncertainty to examine this issue. Using firm size as the 
proxy, for instance, the one-year BHARs of the ―silence‖ portfolios for small and large firms are 
–9.25% and –3.64%, and the ―silence‖ portfolios underperform their corresponding ―sell‖ 
portfolios by 5.42% and 3.91%, respectively (all these numbers are highly significant).  
Taken in its entirety, our evidence strongly supports the jeopardy hypothesis based on the 
work of DeMarzo, Fishman, and Hagerty (1998). The evidence is also consistent with the desire 
for firms to impose blackout period policy during the time that information asymmetry is high. 
Bettis, Coles, and Lemmon (2000) find that blackout period policy is quite common in the 
United States. Our paper also complements prior studies on strategic behavior in insider trading 
due to concerns about legal jeopardy (Ke, Huddart, and Petroni, 2003; Huddart, Ke, and Shi, 
2007).  
We consider two alternative hypotheses. One is litigation risk. Because insider trading is 
related to shareholder litigation (e.g., Johnson, Kasznik, and Nelson, 2000; Kim and Skinner, 
2012), litigation risk can be viewed as an alternative mechanism that monitors opportunistic 
insider trading. Insiders of firms that are subject to high litigation risk may refrain from trading 
even when their information is not as extreme. Consistent with this interpretation, our analysis 
shows that insider silence is associated with weaker negative future returns for firms with higher 
litigation risk. However, these negative future returns remain significant, suggesting that 
litigation risk does not explain our main results. This conclusion is reconfirmed in our Fama-
MacMeth (1973) cross-sectional regressions, in which many other potential confounding factors 
are controlled for. Among the factors we consider, we particularly control for short interest, the 
variable we use to separate firms with positive information from those with negative information. 
Consistent with the short selling literature, we find that higher short interest predicts lower future 
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returns. The coefficients on insider silence, however, remain significant in all regression models 
we estimate.  
The other alternative hypothesis is that insiders’ portfolio constraints, as analyzed in 
Marin and Olivier (2008), drive our main result. The key insight of their model is that insiders 
face some portfolio constraints. For example, insiders cannot short sell; insiders hold the shares 
to maintain control; the shares insiders hold are restricted and not available for sale. A period of 
heavy insider selling followed by a period of relatively low trading activity signals to the market 
that insiders possess bad information. When uninformed investors update their beliefs on 
expected payoffs and risk, a price crash occurs. Our analysis confirms that insider silence 
following a period of heavy selling predicts significant negative returns. After excluding these 
heavy-selling stocks, however, the reaming stocks still experience significant negative returns. 
Therefore, it is unlikely that portfolio constraints drive our result. 
Our paper is closely related Marin and Olivier (2008) but differs from theirs in at least 
two important aspects. First, the phenomenon of ―insider silence‖ is totally independent from the 
phenomenon of ―the dog that did not bark‖ examined in their paper. Simply put in the language 
of ―the dog that did not bark,‖ Marin and Olivier (2008) analyze the situation in which the dog 
has lowered its barking for a short recent period after having barked hard for a long time, 
whereas our paper investigates the situation in which the dog has not barked for a long period of 
time. This point is clearly reflected in our empirical work. To illustrate, firm/month observations 
that have no insider trading in the past year will be filtered out in the baseline analysis of Marin 
and Olivier (2008), whereas such observations occupy the center stage in our analysis. That is, 
these firms, if among the top short interest quintile, experience significant negative returns in the 
future, which are even lower than when insiders net sell in the past. Second, the implications on 
price efficiency are exactly opposite. The ―insider silence‖ phenomenon is associated with price 
inefficiency. That is, it takes long time for the market to fully incorporate the ―insider silence‖ 
information into stock prices and a significant portion of it is released through earnings 
announcements. By contrast, the stock price crash in the phenomenon of ―the dog that did not 
bark‖ is consistent with investor rationality and market efficiency. With these significant 
differences, our work complements Marin and Olivier (2008). They show the information 
content of insider selling, and we are, to the best of our knowledge, the first to systematically 
examine the frequent phenomenon of ―insider silence,‖ namely, when insiders do not trade. Our 
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evidence that insider silence is informative complements the extensive literature on insider 
trading, which focuses almost exclusively on insider buying and selling transactions. Broadly 
speaking, the finding that insider silence contains information also provides direct evidence 
supporting theoretical models on information and the lack of trading (e.g., Diamond and 
Verrecchia, 1987; Easley and O’Hara, 1992).  
The finding that the negative information contained in insider silence is gradually 
incorporated into stock prices and that the information is released mainly through quarterly 
earnings announcements adds new empirical evidence to the growing literature on investor 
underreaction and return predictability (see a survey in Barberis and Thaler, 2003). Our evidence 
suggests that investors systematically underreact to insider silence and are surprised when firm-
specific information is released in earnings announcements.   
Last but not least, our study has implications for the link between insider trading 
regulation and price efficiency. One of the most prominent reasons for deregulating insider 
trading is that insider trading improves price efficiency (Manne, 1966). The evidence that 
supports this argument comes primarily from the informativeness of insider trading (see 
Meulbroek, 1992; Manne, 2005 and references therein). Little is known what happens to 
information when regulation does not allow insider trading, and how the suppressed information 
eventually gets into stock prices? Our paper provides evidence that regulations reduce price 
efficiency by suppressing insider trading and distorting the flow of insider information into a 
―silent‖ form, which is only gradually incorporated into stock prices, mainly through earnings 
announcements. While by no means do we take a stance on whether insider trading should be 
further regulated or deregulated, our evidence sheds light on the mechanism through which 
regulations affect the flow of information, which in turn affects price efficiency.
5
  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we develop the 
hypothesis and empirical strategies. Section 3 describes the data and samples. Section 4 presents 
results based on a sample of merger targets and a sample of bankruptcy firms. In section 5 we 
use short interest as an ex-ante signal to classify firms with positive and negative information 
and present evidence on the information content of insider silence, how the information is 
incorporated into stock prices, and how market frictions affect the price inefficiency due to 
                                                          
5
 Fishman and Hagerty (1992) argue that insider trading could reduce price efficiency due to two adverse effects on 
the competitiveness of the market. That is, insider trading deters other traders from acquiring information, and it 
skews the distribution of information held by traders toward just one trader.  
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insider silence. We discuss alternative hypotheses and robustness checks in Section 6 and 
conclude in section 7.  
2. Hypothesis development and empirical strategy  
2.1. Hypothesis  
Insider trading is regulated in the United States, and trading on insider information is 
generally illegal.
6
 Firms respond to the regulations by imposing blackout period policies during 
the time of high information asymmetry (Bettis, Coles, and Lemmon, 2000). Both government 
and firm-level regulations affect insider trading decisions. The most relevant component of 
Federal regulation is known as the ―disclose or abstain‖ rule, which requires insiders to disclose 
the private information before trading, or to abstain from trading until the information has been 
disclosed. The theoretical work of DeMarzo, Fishman, and Hagerty (1998) on the optimal 
enforcement of insider trading regulations suggests that insiders keep silent on moderate or 
extreme news, but trade aggressively on news with intermediate price impact.
7
 In addition, 
empirical studies on insider trading behaviors suggest that insiders strategically arrange their 
trading when they possess private information. Ke, Huddart, and Petroni (2003), for example, 
find that insiders increase selling shares three to nine quarters prior to a break in a string of 
consecutive increases in quarterly earnings. Huddart, Ke, and Shi (2007) study the timing of 
insider trading around SEC 10-K and 10-Q filings and report that insiders avoid profitable trades 
when the legal jeopardy associated with such trades is high, such as trades immediately prior to 
earnings announcements.  
Based on these prior studies, we propose a jeopardy hypothesis, which posits that to 
avoid legal jeopardy, insiders do not trade when they possess extreme information, and they 
trade (either buy or sell) while possessing intermediate information. Thus the jeopardy 
hypothesis implies that insider silence is associated with extreme future returns, whereas insider 
buying or selling is associated with intermediate future returns.  
2.2. Empirical strategy and testable implications 
                                                          
6
 See Seyhun (1992), Meulbroek (1992), and Bainbridge (1999, 2007) for a complete discussion of the legal rules 
and institutions related to insider trading. 
7
 The model of DeMarzo, Fishman, and Hagerty (1998) applies to informed investors in general who are not 
necessarily employees of the company and thus are not necessarily required to report their trades to the SEC. For 
insider trades that we examine, insiders are required to report their trades to the SEC, a requirement that makes the 
implication on the relation between extreme information and silence even more straightforward. With ex-post 
verifiable trades on SEC record, insiders dare not trade before large price movements.  
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Because insider silence can be associated with either positive or negative extreme news, a 
sound empirical strategy for testing the hypothesis requires separating firms whose insiders have 
positive information from those whose insiders have negative information. In other words, we 
need test this hypothesis conditional on insider information. A simple example illustrates this 
point. Suppose firms GG, BB, G, B, and N have extremely good, extremely bad, good, bad, and 
no information, respectively. If the jeopardy hypothesis is at work, the researcher observes 
insider silence from firms GG, BB, and N, insider buying in firm G, and selling in firm B. For a 
sample in which firms GG, BB, and N are pooled together, the detected future return would be 
an average of very high returns from firm GG, very low returns from firm BB, and zero returns 
from firm N. Thus the average future return of the silence group as a whole is attenuated toward 
zero. As a result, analyses of a pooled sample are less effective in testing the jeopardy 
hypothesis. A more powerful empirical design should first separate GG firms from BB firms.  
We consider two distinct and complementary approaches. The first is based on ex-post 
corporate events that unequivocally pertain to extremely good or bad information. Ke, Huddart, 
and Petroni (2003), for example, adopt this approach and identify their sample firms that 
experience a break in a string of earnings increases, a clear scenario of extremely negatively 
information. We choose two special events: corporate merger offers and bankruptcy filing. It is 
well documented in the literature that a company receiving a merger offer experiences significant 
share price increase at the announcement (e.g., Jensen and Ruback, 1983). Recent studies on 
mergers document that a long private negotiation process exists before the public announcement 
(Boone and Mulherin, 2007), suggesting that insiders of merger targets are aware of the deal 
prior to the public announcement. Thus, merger targets provide a clean testing ground for the 
jeopardy hypothesis, which implies in this situation that insiders of merger targets stop buying 
their own company shares in the months leading to the deal announcement. Further, this 
phenomenon should be more pronounced for targets in friendly deals, in which insiders of the 
targets have been involved in and thus have foreknowledge of the upcoming announcement. By 
contrast, insiders of targets receiving hostile or unsolicited merger offers are less likely to stop 
buying their own company shares. Similarly, firms that filed bankruptcy provide another clean 
testing ground for the case of extremely negative information. The jeopardy hypothesis implies 
that insiders refrain from selling before the bankruptcy filing.  
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Although the approach based on ex-post events has the benefit of cleanness from 
hindsight, it has limitations. First of all, such special events are relatively rare. Second, the case 
of merger offers makes it trivial to investigate how the information is incorporated into stock 
prices – the target stock price immediately increases at the announcement and on average stays 
flat thereafter. This result is well documented in the literature (and we also confirm it in our 
analysis). Further, in both cases ex-post information is not tradable.  
Our second approach complements the first by relying on an ex-ante signal to distinguish 
firms with negative information from those with positive information. At the first glance such an 
ex-ante signal seems impossible as it would imply profitable arbitrage opportunities and thus a 
direct violation of market efficiency. With limited arbitrage in real life (De Long, Shleifer, 
Summers, and Walkman, 1990; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997), however, such a signal may exist. 
The recent growing literature on short selling provides overwhelming evidence that short interest 
might be a viable candidate. For example, short sellers use fundamental information in their 
trades (Dechow, Hutton, Meulbroek, and Sloan, 2001; Drake, Rees, and Swanson, 2011); they 
become informed by better interpreting firm-specific public news (Engelberg, Reed, and 
Ringgenberg, 2012); armed with information advantage, short sellers exploit profitable 
opportunities prior to earnings announcements, analyst downgrade, and earnings restatement 
(Christophe, Ferri, and Angel, 2004; Desai, Krishnamurthy, and Venkataraman, 2006; 
Christophe, Ferri, Hsieh, 2010; Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang, 2012); they are even able to identify 
financial misconduct (Karpoff and Lou, 2010). With these information advantages, it is not 
surprising that short selling flows and short interest predict future stock returns (Jones and 
Lamont, 2002; Asquith, Pathak, and Ritter, 2005; Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang, 2008; Diether, 
Lee, and Werner, 2009; Boehmer, Huszar, and Jordan, 2010; Purnanandam and Seyhun, 2011). 
In addition, short interest information is at least monthly updated and easily available for most, if 
not all, stocks.  
We thus use short interest to classify firms, ex ante, into those with positive information 
(lightly shorted stocks) and those with negative information (heavily shorted stocks). This setting 
allows testing the following two implications of the jeopardy hypothesis.  
(a) Among firms with positive information, firms whose insiders do not trade in the past 
earn positive future returns, which are higher than do firms whose insiders net buy. 
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(b) Among firms with negative information, firms whose insiders do not trade in the past 
earn negative future returns, which are lower than do firms whose insiders net sell. 
Further, to the extent that having abstained from trading for a longer time period before 
the information is released better shields insiders from legal jeopardy, insiders who possess more 
extreme information should have remained silent for a longer period. The point is clear when one 
compares the extreme case of bankruptcy (see Section 4.2) with the relatively mild case analyzed 
in Ke, Huddart, and Petroni (2003), in which the firms experience a break in a string of earnings 
increases. As we show later in the paper insiders of the firms that file bankruptcy start to refrain 
from selling almost three years before the filing. By contrast, Ke, Huddart, and Petroni (2003) 
report evidence that insiders increase selling shares about nine to three quarters before the break 
in the string of earnings increases. We thus have the last implication of the jeopardy hypothesis. 
(c) The longer is the silence period, the more extreme are the future returns.  
3. Data and samples  
3.1. Data  
We obtain insider trading data from Thomson Reuters Insider Filing Data Feed. The 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) mandates that officers and directors, large 
shareholders (those who own 10% or more of the outstanding shares), and affiliated shareholders 
report their transactions to the SEC by the 10
th
 of the month following the transactions (prior to 
August 2002) or within two days following the transactions (since August 2002). Following 
previous studies (e.g., Rozeff and Zaman, 1998; Piotroski and Roulstone, 2005; Sias and 
Whidbee, 2010), we limit our analysis to officers and directors because previous research shows 
the information content of insider trading is mainly limited to trades by directors and officers.
8
 
We define net insider demand (NID) for period t in equation (1). Our main analyses focus on 
NID measured over the past six months, but the results are robust to NID measured over 
different horizons, such as the past three months or 12 months.
9
  
        
                                                  
                       
     (1) 
                                                          
8
 We follow the literature (e.g., Lakonishok and Lee 2001; Sias and Whidbee 2010) to ―clean‖ the insider trading 
data. Specifically, we use the following filters. We delete duplicate and amended records and records with cleanse 
code of ―S‖ or ―A‖ are deleted. Transaction price must be available, and we delete records if the number of shares in 
a transaction is below 100. The transaction code is either ―P‖ or ―S‖ for stock transactions and ―M‖ for options 
exercised. We delete transactions that involve more than 20% of total shares outstanding, and delete records if the 
transaction price is outside the 80%–120% range of the CRSP end-of-day stock price.  
9
 We use the insider trades that are reported to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) during the past six 
months. Our results are robust to using trades that occur during the time period.  
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We define a firm j over time period t as insider net buying if         , net selling if 
        , and silence if no insider trading activity is reported to the SEC.  
For the period between January 1992 and December 2002, we obtain monthly short 
interest data from the exchanges, and for the period between January 2003 and December 2010 
we extract the data from Standard and Poor’s Compustat. Following the literature, we scale short 
interest by the number of shares outstanding at the end of each month to obtain the short interest 
ratio, shown in equation (2):  
        
           
         
         (2) 
where SHORTINTj,t is the number of shares of short interest for stock j at the end of month t, and 
SHROUTj,t is the total number of shares outstanding for stock j of month t. To minimize data 
error we exclude stock month observations if there is a stock split in the month or the short 
interest exceeds 50%.  
We obtain stock return data from CRSP and accounting data from Compustat. Appendix 
A provides definitions of the complete list of variables. We follow the literature to construct the 
buy-and-hold abnormal returns after portfolio formation (Laknoishock and Lee, 2001; Sias and 
Whidbee, 2010). Appendix B describes the procedure in detail.  
3.2. Samples 
We construct three samples. One is a sample of merger targets. From the Securities Data 
Corporation (SDC) database, we construct a sample of firms receiving merger offers during 
1992–2010. We restrict the deal size to be at least US$50 million; the target firm is publicly 
traded; the transaction form is merger or acquisition. For a target receiving multiple offers, we 
keep the first announcement only. The final sample has 4,267 targets. From SDC we also 
construct a sample of firms that filed bankruptcy during 1992-2010. We focus on the 524 firms 
that have stock price and return data in the month of filing, although the main message remains 
the same without this restriction.  
The sample for the ex-ante signal approach is based on all common stocks (share code 10 
or 11) covered in CRSP/Compustat merged database. We exclude stocks whose stock price at the 
end of the previous December is lower than $2 and firms younger than a year (from the first 
month on CRSP file with valid price and return data). After merging these databases, our final 
dataset covers insider trading and short interest data from January 1992 to December 2010 and 
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stock-return data up to December 2011. Our return data covers 227 cross-sections (February 
1992 to December 2010) with an average cross-section size of 3,895.  
3.3. Summary statistics  
Table 1 shows the percentage of firms whose insiders keep silent, net buy, and net sell, as 
well as the distribution of non-missing net insider demand (NID), as defined in equation (1). 
Based on a six-month interval, in 33% of the firms insiders do not trade; insider net buying 
consists of 20.5% of the sample, and insider net selling consists of the remaining 46.6%. The 
percentage of insider silence is 74.1%, 49.4%, and 19.5% when NID is measured over the past 
one, three, and 12 months, respectively. Sias and Whidbee (2010), one of the recent studies 
covering a similar time period, imply the percentage of no insider trading over a quarter is 49.8% 
(see their first two rows of Table 9 on page 1578). These numbers suggest insider silence is a 
frequent phenomenon. In addition, the distribution of our quarterly NID is very similar to that 
reported in Sias and Whidbee (2010, Table 1). 
To see how insider silence fluctuates over time, Panel A of Figure 1 plots the month-by-
month proportions of firms whose insiders net buy, net sell, or keep silent over the trailing six 
months. The percentage of insider silence exhibits a decreasing trend, especially at the time point 
when the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) took effect (August 2002), indicating that the recent 
regulation on insider trading has an impact on insider trading activities. Insider selling increased 
from the early 2000s to mid-2007, when the recent financial crisis occurred. On the other hand, 
the percentage of firms with net insider buying increased following the start of the recent crisis 
but decreased after early 2009.  
To see how insider trading is correlated with short interest, we sort firms into short 
interest deciles and calculate the fractions of firms with insider silence, net buying, and net 
selling within each decile. Panel B of Figure 1 shows that the percentage of firms with net insider 
selling increases when short interest piles up. Overall, the strong correlation between NID and 
short interest is consistent with short sellers being informed (as discussed in Section 2) and 
suggests that it is reasonable to use short interest to distinguish firms with positive information 
from those with negative information.  
[Insert Table 1 & Figure 1 about here] 
4. Evidence based on ex-post corporate events  
 13 
 
In this section we examine the samples of merger targets and bankruptcy firms, 
respectively. The jeopardy hypothesis implies that insiders of a merger target refrain from buying 
in the months leading to the public announcement of the merger deal. For the bankruptcy firms, 
insiders refrain from selling in the months prior to the bankruptcy filing. 
4.1. The sample of merger offers 
Table 2 presents the average monthly abnormal return (using a benchmark as described in 
Appendix B), p-value of the abnormal return, cumulative abnormal return, percent of target firms 
whose insiders net buy, and percent of firms whose insiders net sell for the 24 months before and 
12 months after the announcement. Figure 2 plots the cumulative abnormal returns and the 
proportion of firms whose insiders net buy. Consistent with the prior literature (e.g., Jensen and 
Ruback, 1983; Jarrell, Brickley, and Netter, 1988; Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford, 2001), the 
abnormal return of target firms is large in the announcement month (25.2%) and is statistically 
significant at the 1% level. Also consistent with the literature (e.g., Schwert, 1996), there is 
evidence of price run-up in the months immediately leading to the announcement, and the target 
stock price stays flat on average after the announcement.  
During the months long before the public announcement, the proportion of targets whose 
insiders net buy is around 8-10%, which is slightly higher than but generally in line with the 
grand sample average of 7.6% (see Table 1). This percentage starts to drop when it approaches 
the announcement month and reaches 2.9% during the announcement month. Unreported  tests 
show that the proportion of firms with insider net buying during any of the three months right 
before the announcement is statistically different (at the 1% level) from that during any of the 
months from the 24
th
 to the sixth months before the announcement.
10
  
In unsolicited or hostile deals, insiders of targets are less likely to be aware of the 
upcoming takeover offer and are less likely to have abstained from buying shares of their own 
companies, as compared to friendly deals in which target insiders have been involved in the 
private deal process. In an unreported analysis, we conduct the same investigation as in Table 2 
and Figure 2 for the subsample of 275 hostile (or unsolicited) deals and find no significant 
                                                          
10
 Note that an interesting pattern also exists in the proportion of targets with insider net selling. During the period 
before the public announcement, the proportion of net selling is between 18% and 20%, which is in line with the 
grand sample average of 18.3% (see Table 1). This proportion reduces to 10.4% in the month before the 
announcement. Thus, insiders delay selling, with the knowledge of the upcoming price appreciation upon the 
announcement. This delayed selling is consistent with the passive buying behavior analyzed in Agrawal and Nasser 
(2012). 
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evidence of decreasing proportion of targets with net insider buying during the months prior to 
the announcement. On the other hand, the subsample of 3,992 friendly deals exhibits the exact 
pattern as shown in Table 2 and Figure 2. 
[Insert Table 2 & Figure 2 about here] 
4.2. The sample of bankruptcy firms 
For the sample of bankruptcy firms, Figure 3 plots the cumulative abnormal returns from 
60 months before to 12 months after the bankruptcy filing month. It shows that the stock price 
starts to decline from 30 months before the filing. To see how insiders respond to the negative 
information, we draw, month by month, the proportion of these firms whose insiders net sell. We 
also draw its six-month moving average. The figure clearly exhibits a declining trend on the 
proportion of firms with insider net selling from 30 months before the filing (about 10%) to the 
month of the filing (about 5%). This evidence is consistent with the jeopardy hypothesis that 
insiders abstain from selling while anticipating big negative news. What appears striking, 
insiders start to abstain from selling as early as almost two and half years before the bankruptcy 
filing. This pattern indicates that insiders choose to abstain from trading well in advance when 
the consequence of the private information is extreme.
11
 We revisit the length of insider silence 
when testing the jeopardy hypothesis based on an ex-ante signal (see Section 5.2).  
[Insert Figure 3 about here] 
Overall, our results based on ex-post corporate events strongly support the jeopardy 
hypothesis. That is, insiders of a target who are aware of the forthcoming public announcement 
of the merger offer abstain from trading (more explicitly, buying) to avoid legal jeopardy. 
Likewise, insiders of a bankruptcy firm who have private information about the upcoming 
extremely bad news refrain from selling long before the filing.   
5. Evidence based on an ex-ante signal  
                                                          
11
 The insider trading pattern in our sample differs from that reported in Seyhun and Bradley (1997), who analyze a 
sample of bankruptcy firms during 1975-1992 and find that insiders on average increase selling shares when it 
approaches the bankruptcy filing date. This pattern is in stark contrast to the concern of legal jeopardy. The 
difference between these two samples is probably due to the enforcement of insider trading becoming stricter over 
time so that insiders in bankruptcy cases have learned to be more sensitive to legal jeopardy. There is indication, 
however, that even in the early years some executives have shown concerns of legal jeopardy. Specifically, Seyhun 
and Bradley (1997, p. 200) find that about 40% of their sample firms report no trades by top executives over a 7-
year horizon (five before and two after the filing). Seyhun and Bradley (1997, p.200) allude to illegal insider trading 
not reported to the SEC. This interpretation is consistent with our jeopardy hypothesis.  
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We examine in this section the link between insider silence and future stock returns, 
using short interest as an ex-ante signal to distinguish between firms with positive and negative 
information.  
5.1. Insider silence and future returns 
We first monthly rank stocks into quintiles based on their short interest measured as of 
the previous month. Among the sample of stocks, we then monthly form three portfolios based 
on their insider trading activity over the past six months. The ―silence,‖ ―buy,‖ and ―sell‖ 
portfolios consist of stocks whose insiders have not traded, bought in net, and sold in net, 
respectively, within the past six months. For each of the portfolios we then calculate the equal-
weight buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) over the subsequent holding period of one, three, 
six, 12, and 24 months.
12
 We consider the impact of firm size in Sections 5.3 and 5.5. Table 3 
presents the time-series average of the portfolio BHARs with their t-statistics based on Newey-
West (1987) standard errors shown in brackets. Panel A uses the whole sample; Panels B and C 
use the sample of stocks in the top and bottom short interest quintiles, respectively.  
Panel A shows that insider silence in general predicts negative future stock returns. The 
―silence‖ portfolio, for example, on average has a 12-month BHAR of -2.3%, which is 
significant at the 1% level. In addition, this negative return pattern is not reversed at least up to 
two years after portfolio formation. As discussed in Section 2, insider silence can be associated 
with both negative and positive extreme information. Thus a significant negative return 
associated with insider silence in a pooled sample indicates that the impact of extremely negative 
information outweighs that of extremely positive information. 
Consistent with the prior literature on insider trading (e.g., Seyhun, 1986, 1998; 
Lakonishok and Lee, 2001; Sias and Whidbee, 2010), there is a significant return spread between 
the ―buy‖ and ―sell‖ portfolios over a holding period of up to three months. The last two rows of 
Panel A show that the return difference in 12-month BHAR between the ―silence‖ and ―sell‖ 
portfolios is a significant -1.98%. In unreported tests, the spread between the ―silence‖ and ―buy‖ 
portfolios are also significant.  
Panel B reports portfolio returns for the sample of stocks with high short interest (top 
quintile). Insider silence predicts significant future negative returns up to two years: the 12- and 
                                                          
12
 For holding periods up to 12 months, our return data cover January 1992 to December 2010; for the 24-month 
holding period, our return data cover January 1992 to December 2009.  
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24-month BHARs of ―silence‖ portfolios are –7.3% and –10.9%, respectively, both highly 
significant. By contrast, the ―sell‖ portfolio experiences only small negative future returns, which 
last for only a short horizon (up to six months). Indeed, the 12-month BHAR of the ―sell‖ 
portfolio is only –1.43%, which is not statistically different from zero. The difference between 
the ―silence‖ and ―sell‖ portfolios for any holding period is significant, and its magnitude grows 
with the holding period. Figure 4 plots the average BHARs of these portfolios over the one- to 
12-month holding periods. The ―silence‖ portfolio shows a striking negative drift, whereas the 
―buy‖ and ―sell‖ portfolios have rather flat abnormal returns. Overall, these results strongly 
support the jeopardy hypothesis that insiders abstain from trading when they possess extremely 
negative information.
13
  
Panel C reports portfolio returns for the sample of stocks with low short interest (the 
bottom quintile). There is no evidence consistent with the jeopardy hypothesis regarding 
extremely positive information. Over any holding period, no significant positive BHARs of the 
―silence‖ portfolios are present, and the ―silence‖ portfolio does not outperform the ―buy‖ 
portfolio. One possible explanation for the lack of significant positive returns associated with 
insider silence in Panel C is that low short interest on average is not ―extreme‖ enough to trigger 
concerns about legal jeopardy. The point is clear if one compares the evidence in Panel C of 
Table 3 to that of Table 2 and Figure 2. When insiders possess extremely positive information 
such as that of a merger offer, insiders refrain from trading to avoid legal jeopardy. 
 [Insert Table 3 & Figure 4 about here] 
 In subsequent analyses we focus on the subsample of firms with negative information 
(firms in the top short interest quintile). As discussed earlier, this setting affords us the 
opportunity to examine how information in insider silence is incorporated into stock prices.  
5.2. Length of the silence period  
The jeopardy hypothesis implies a relation between the length of insider silence and the 
magnitude of future abnormal returns. Insiders of firms with more negative information are more 
likely to abstain from trading long before the start of stock price decline. As a result, among 
                                                          
13
 In unreported analysis we find that ―silence‖ portfolio membership is somewhat sticky. The average probability 
for a stock in the ―silence‖ portfolio (within the top short interest quintile) to join the ―silence,‖ ―buy,‖, and ―sell‖ 
portfolios (still in the top short interest quintile) six months later is 34%, 10%, and 21%, respectively. For the rest of 
the stocks, 24% remain in the sample but out of the top short interest quintile, and 11% of them drop out of the 
grand sample.  
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firms with negative information, a longer period of insider silence is associated with even lower 
future returns.  
For stocks in the top short interest quintile, we further form four mutually exclusive 
portfolios based on the length of insider silence. Firms whose insiders do not trade over the 
recent month but have traded prior to that month form the portfolio ―Silence for 1 month.‖ Firms 
whose insiders do not trade over the recent three months but have traded prior to that period form 
the portfolio ―Silence for 3 months.‖ Firms whose insiders do not trade over the recent six 
months but have traded prior to that period form the portfolio ―Silence for 6 months.‖ Firms 
whose insiders do not trade over the recent 12 months form the portfolio ―Silence for 12 
months.‖ Because we need at least 12-month history of insider trading, we restrict firms in this 
exercise to be at least 18 months old.  
Figure 5 plots the average BHARs of these silence portfolios over a one-year holding 
horizon. The figure clearly shows that a longer period of insider silence is associated with lower 
(more negative) future returns. Table 4 presents those BHARs and their Newey-West t-statistics 
for the holding horizons of one, three, six, 12, and 24 months. For holding periods longer than 
six months, the abnormal returns decrease with the length of silence period. The BHAR 
differences between the two extreme portfolios are statistically significant and economically 
large, with the magnitude ranging from 0.71% for a one-month holding period to 15.29% for a 
two-year holding period. In sum, these results are strongly consistent with the implication of the 
jeopardy hypothesis. 
[Insert Table 4 & Figure 5 about here] 
5.3. Month-by-month abnormal returns following insider silence 
Our previous results in Figure 4 and Table 3 indicate that the market underreacts to the 
negative information in insider silence so that the information is only gradually incorporated into 
stock prices. We provide more detailed, formal results in this section. 
For the three insider trading portfolios formed among stocks with high short interest (see 
descriptions for Panel B of Table 3), we estimate their monthly abnormal returns (alphas) based 
on the Fama-French-Carhart four-factor model (Fama and French, 1993; Carhart, 1997) and 
report results in Table 5. In particular, we monthly form ―silence,‖ ―buy,‖ and ―sell‖ portfolios, 
and calculate both equal-weight (Panel A) and value-weight (Panel B) monthly alphas for each 
month during the one-year holding period after portfolio formation. On an equal-weight basis, 
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we find significant negative alphas for the ―silence‖ portfolio over a long period of time. For 
example, the first and ninth monthly alphas are –0.96% and –0.43%, respectively. The market 
seems to take at least nine months to fully incorporate the negative information of insider silence. 
The general pattern remains in the value-weight alphas although the magnitude is smaller. These 
results, also shown in Figure 6, clearly suggest that the negative information in insider silence is 
gradually incorporated into stock prices.  
[Insert Table 5 & Figure 6 about here] 
5.4. Earnings announcement returns following insider silence  
To further investigate whether investors underreact to the negative information associated 
with insider silence and whether they are systematically surprised when firm-specific news is 
disclosed to the market, we extract quarterly earnings announcement dates from Compustat and 
calculate three-day announcement period abnormal returns adjusted by CRSP equal-weight daily 
market returns (i.e., an event window [-1, +1] covering one trading day before and one day after 
the earnings announcement date). Specifically, within an insider trading portfolio, we calculate 
the three-day abnormal returns of its earnings-announcement firms for every month during the 
12 months following portfolio formation. Table 6 presents the time-series average of the 
abnormal returns for each of the three portfolios (―silence,‖ ―buy,‖ and ―sell‖).14 For convenience 
the results are also illustrated in Figure 7. 
The results appear striking. First, the ―silence‖ portfolio has incurred negative abnormal 
returns during its firms’ earnings announcement period (all 12 post-portfolio formation months 
have negative returns and eight of them are statistically significant). In contrast, the ―sell‖ 
portfolio has experienced no significant return at all. Second, the economic magnitude is 
significant relative to the monthly alphas. Panel B presents, month by month, the ratio of the 
earnings announcement returns to the same-month equal-weight alpha for the ―silence‖ portfolio. 
For example, in the first month after portfolio formation, the three-day abnormal return accounts 
for 32% of the same-month alpha; in the fourth month, the three-day abnormal return accounts 
for 93% of the same-month alpha.  
Overall, among the sample of stocks with high short interest, our analyses in this section 
suggest (1) the market underreacts to the negative information of insider silence, and the return 
                                                          
14
 We follow the methodology developed in Chopra, Lakonishok, and Ritter (1992), which is used in Jegadeesh and 
Titman (1993), La Porta, Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997), and Titman, Wei, and Xie (2004), among others.  
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predictability of insider silence lasts for at least nine months in the future; and (2) investors of 
the firms whose insiders keep silent are systematically surprised during earnings announcements, 
in which the negative firm-specific information is disclosed to the market. 
[Insert Table 6 and Figure 7 about here]  
5.5. Insider silence and market frictions 
In the previous section, we establish that insider silence coupled with high short interest 
predicts significant negative future returns, indicating these stocks are overpriced and investors 
underreact to insider silence. This pattern is inconsistent with an efficient market that allows 
perfect arbitrage. Stock markets in reality, however, have frictions. As Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997) analyze, real-life arbitrageurs are professionals and their arbitrage strategy can be risky 
and far from perfect. In addition, information uncertainty plays a role in return predictability 
(e.g., Zhang, 2006). In this section we examine how these market frictions (limits to arbitrage or 
information uncertainty) affect the information in insider silence. Our prior is that insider silence 
predicts even more negative returns for stocks that are more difficult to arbitrage or that have 
higher information uncertainty. 
To see how limits to arbitrage or information uncertainty (LTA/IU) affects the 
information in insider silence, we follow Choi and Sias (2012) and construct the following 10 
proxies for LTA/IU: (1) firm size, (2) institutional ownership, (3) number of institutional owners, 
(4) number of analysts following, (5) firm age, (6) idiosyncratic volatility, (7) total volatility, (8) 
Amihud (2002) illiquidity, (9) Amihud modified illiquidity, (10) dollar trading volume.
15
 These 
variables are defined in Appendix A.   
Every month we split stocks in the top short interest quintile into two equal groups based 
on one of the 10 LTA/IU variables. Within each group, we form two portfolios, ―silence‖ and 
―sell,‖ in the same way we do in Panel B of Table 3. Since we only compare between insider 
silence and insider net selling, firms whose insiders net buy are excluded in this analysis. We 
report the average BHARs of these portfolios (and their return differences) over the subsequent 
one-, three-, six-, and 12-month holding periods. We also report t-statistics for the difference in 
the two ―silence‖ portfolios between the high and low LTA/IU firms.  
                                                          
15
 These proxies are also discussed in Ali, Hwang, and Trombley (2003), Baker and Wurgler (2006), Brav, Heaton, 
and Li (2010), and Lam and Wei (2011). 
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Table 7 establishes the following three results. First, for the group of stocks with low 
LTA/IU, there is strong evidence that supports the jeopardy hypothesis. For each LTA/IU proxy, 
the ―silence‖ portfolio has significantly negative BHARs over each of the four holding horizons. 
For example, the least negative one-year BHAR of the ―silence‖ portfolio is –3.17% using stocks 
with many institutions (Panel C), and the most negative one is –5.19% using stocks with high 
dollar trading volumes (Panel J). By contrast, the ―sell‖ portfolio generally has BHARs that are 
not statistically different from zero, especially for holding periods beyond three months. As a 
result, the BHAR differences between the ―silence‖ and ―sell‖ portfolios are highly significant 
across various proxies for firms with low LTA/IU. For example, in the case of three-month 
BHAR, seven out of 10 return differences are significant, and in the case of one-year BHAR, all 
10 return differences are significant. This evidence indicates that insider silence contains 
information even for stocks facing relatively weak frictions. 
Second, for the group of stocks with high LTA/IU, we also find strong negative BHARs 
associated with insider silence. Interestingly, the ―sell‖ portfolio has significantly negative 
BHARs across the LTA/IU proxies and over various holding periods. However, the BHAR 
differences between the ―silence‖ and ―sell‖ portfolios remain highly significant across various 
specifications: 39 out of 40 return differences are statistically significant. In addition, these 
return differences are also economically large. The one-year BHAR difference, for example, 
ranges from –4.82% based on stocks with few institutions (Panel C) to –7.60% based on stocks 
with high total volatility (Panel G). These results further support the jeopardy hypothesis for the 
group of stocks with high LTA/IU. 
Last, insider silence is associated with even lower future returns for stocks that are more 
difficult to arbitrage or that have higher information uncertainty. In the last column, we report 
the t-statistics testing the differences between the two ―silence‖ portfolios. All are significant. 
The overall evidence in Table 7 suggests that the price inefficiency in insider silence is 
pervasive and that market frictions such as limits to arbitrage and information uncertainty make 
it even worse.
16
  
                                                          
16
 Because stocks with high short interest are on average small (Boehmer, Huszar, and Jordan, 2010), one may argue 
that these firms are all subject to strong limits to arbitrage or have high information uncertainty. In an unreported 
analysis, we find it is not the case. Specifically, we split the sample according to NYSE size breakpoints. For firms 
within the top three NYSE size deciles that are also within the top short interest quintile, we find strong negative 
return for the ―silence‖ portfolio over the subsequent 12 months (–4.77%), which  is significantly lower than the 
―sell‖ portfolio as the spread is a significant –5.08%. Unreported for brevity, these results are available upon request. 
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[Insert Table 7 about here] 
6. Alternative hypotheses and robustness 
In this section we examine alternative hypotheses and discuss robustness checks for the 
main result presented in Panel B of Table 3.  
6.1. The role of litigation risk 
In addition to government and firm-level regulations on insider trading, shareholder 
litigation provides another mechanism that monitors opportunistic insider trading. Insiders of 
firms with higher litigation risk are less likely to trade opportunistically. Thus, our main results 
in Panel B of Table 3 might be driven by firms with high litigation risk. To examine this 
possibility we split firms in the top short interest quintile into two groups based on a proxy for 
litigation risk and further form insider trading portfolios within each group. We use two proxies 
for litigation risk. The first proxy (FPS) is based on membership in the biotechnology, 
computers, electronics, and retail industries (Francis, Philbrick, and Schipper, 1994a, 1994b). 
The second proxy (KS) is based on a regression model of litigation on accounting and stock 
characteristics, recently developed by Kim and Skinner (2012). The details are described in 
Appendix C.  
We then repeat the exercise in Table 7 by using these two litigation risk proxies to form 
subgroups. Shown in Table 8, the results are as expected. Firms with low litigation risk 
experience lower returns following insider silence or insider net selling. In the subsample of 
firms with high litigation risk, the future returns are less negative. In both subsamples the 
difference between the ―silence‖ and ―sell‖ portfolios is significant, suggesting that litigation risk 
does not subsume the impact of insider silence on price inefficiency.  
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
6.2. Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regressions 
So far our analyses are based on portfolio sorting. This methodology produces portfolio 
results that are easy to interpret, but it has limitations, because the other potentially relevant 
factors are excluded from the analysis. For example, while we use short interest to distinguish 
between firms with positive information and firms with negative information, all firms within the 
top short interest quintile do not have the same short interest. If short interest and insider silence 
are correlated, it is possible that the significant negative return associated with insider silence is 
driven by short interest.  
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For a select list of firm characteristics, Panel A of Table 9 presents the time-series 
averages of the portfolio-level averages of the characteristics for the three insider trading 
portfolios. The panel also shows the differences between these portfolios. The sample includes 
stocks in the top short interest quintile. It appears that indeed the three portfolios differ 
significantly in these characteristics. For example, compared to the ―sell‖ portfolio, firms in the 
―silence‖ portfolio have higher short interest, smaller size, higher B/M ratio, lower return 
momentum, lower institutional ownership, and fewer analysts following. They are, however, not 
necessarily younger and their litigation risk is relatively lower, probably due to smaller size.  
To account for the impact of such factors on future returns, we run Fama-MacBeth 
(1973) cross-sectional regressions. Specifically, every month we regress the 12-month BHARs 
on silence, buy, and other control variables. The variable ―silence‖ is equal to one if insiders of 
the firm have kept silent for the past six months, and zero otherwise. The variable ―buy‖ is 
similarly defined. Panel B of Table 9 reports the time-series averages of the cross-sectional 
regression coefficients, together with their Newey-West t-statistics.  
In Model 1, BHAR is regressed on silence and buy only. The regression coefficients and 
their t-statistics are equivalent to the portfolio results, as reported in Panel B of Table 3. In 
Model 2 we add short interest, which carries a significant negative coefficient, consistent with 
the prior literature (e.g., Boehmer, Huszar, and Jordan, 2010). After controlling for short interest, 
however, the coefficient on silence is still highly significant, both statistically and economically. 
This result suggests that the negative return associated with insider silence is not driven by short 
interest. The coefficient on silence remains significant in Models 3 and 4, where we control for 
firm size, B/M ratio, and return momentum. Firm size has a positive coefficient, consistent with 
the earlier result in Table 7 that larger firms experience less negative returns. To see the impact 
of market frictions, we first add those LTA/IU variables one by one in the list of control 
variables and then add them all (after excluding the obviously highly correlated ones) in the list. 
The coefficients on silence are remarkably robust. For brevity we only present the one with all 
variables included in the regression, shown in Model 5 of Panel B in Table 9. The coefficients on 
the LTA/IU variables are largely as expected. For example, firms with more analysts and higher 
institutional ownership are associated with higher (less negative) future returns.  
Unreported for brevity, we conduct additional robustness checks. We vary the BHAR 
holding period. In general, when the BHAR is measured over a shorter holding period the 
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coefficients on silence are smaller in magnitude. For instance, with a 3-month holding period, the 
coefficient on silence from Model 5 is -0.477% (Newey-West t-stat -1.63); with a 6-month 
holding period, the coefficient on silence is -1.541% (Newey-West t-stat -2.79). This result 
further confirms our earlier finding that information in insider silence is gradually incorporated 
into stock prices. These unreported results are available from the authors upon request. 
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
6.3. The role of portfolio constraints: The Marin and Olivier (2008) model 
In Panel B of Table 3 we test the jeopardy hypothesis based on the assumption that 
insiders have shares available to sell but, due to concerns about legal jeopardy, choose not to. It 
is possible, however, that the outcome of ―no trading‖ is due to portfolio constraints as studied in 
Marin and Olivier (2008). That is, insiders cannot short sell their own company shares, insiders 
have concerns about corporate control, or the shares insiders hold are restricted and not available 
for sale. In the framework of Marin and Olivier (2008), uninformed investors might infer that 
insiders possess bad news and update their beliefs on expected payoffs and risk, leading to a 
price crash, an extreme type of negative returns. Under the Marin and Olivier (2008) framework, 
this alternative hypothesis could be consistent with our main finding in Panel B of Table 3 if the 
silence period is preceded by a period of heavy insider selling. 
To see whether indeed the performance of the ―silence‖ portfolio in Panel B of Table 3 is 
driven by the subsample of firms whose insiders have heavily sold in the past before the silence 
period, we further sort firms in the ―silence‖ portfolio into two portfolios based on their insider 
trading activity before the silence period. We start with the average 207 stocks in the ―silence‖ 
portfolio (see Panel B of Table 3) and restrict to firms at least 18-month old (so that insiders of 
new firms have at least 12 months of trading history). This restriction reduces the average 
number of stocks in the ―silence‖ portfolio to 197. We then examine their insider trading activity 
over the preceding six months period (from months –12 to –7) and form two portfolios: ―Heavy 
sell‖ and ―Others.‖ The ―Heavy sell‖ portfolio consists of firms whose insiders have sold in net 
during months –12 to –7 and that the net insider demand is below the sample median. The 
remaining stocks form the ―Others‖ portfolio. For each portfolio, we calculate their buy-and-hold 
abnormal return (BHAR, in %) over the subsequent 1, 3, 6, 12, and 24 months. For the 24-month 
holding period, we use the sample ending in December 2009. Results are shown in Table 10. 
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For a 12-month holding period, the ―Heavy sell‖ portfolio experiences a significant 
abnormal return of –7.42%, the ―Others‖ portfolio experiences a significant return of -6.72%, 
and the difference between the two is not significant. The evidence suggests that it is unlikely 
that portfolio constraints drive our result.  
[Insert Table 10 about here] 
6.4. The impact of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) 
Before the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) insiders are required to report their trades by the 
10
th
 of the month following the transactions; since SOX (after August 2002) insiders are required 
to report their transactions to the SEC within two business days. Would more prompt disclosure 
of insider trades affect the information content of insider silence? Because the new disclosure 
requirement applies only when insiders buy or sell, one would expect SOX not to have any 
impact on the information content of insider silence. When insiders possess extreme information, 
they would choose not to trade regardless of the requirement of more prompt reporting. To the 
extent that the requirement of more prompt reporting deters informed trades (Brochet, 2010), 
insiders in the new regime might choose not to trade in some situations in which they would 
have traded before SOX. This change would contaminate the ―silence‖ portfolio and make it less 
informative.  
Without a comprehensive theory of the impact of SOX on insider silence, our analysis on 
this issue inevitably becomes exploratory. Further, many other important events took place 
following SOX (e.g., regulation Fair Disclosure, the financial crisis, RegSHO, short-selling ban, 
etc.), making a simple comparison between the before- and after-SOX periods even more 
difficult to interpret. In addition, the SEC enacted rule 10b5-1 in 2000, which effectively allowed 
insiders to strategically sell ahead of negative information (Jagolinzer, 2009). Bearing in mind 
these complexities, our goal in this exercise is modest. Instead of conducting a full-blown 
analysis, we examine whether the jeopardy hypothesis holds both before and after SOX. 
To do so, we split the sample into two subsamples, using August 2002 as the cutoff point. 
For firms within the top short interest quintile, we form insider trading portfolios (―buy,‖ ―sell,‖ 
―silence‖) and examine their future returns for the two subsamples. Table 11 presents the time-
series average abnormal returns for the insider portfolios over the holding periods of one, three, 
six, 12, and 24 months for the before- (Panel A) and after-SOX (Panel B) subsamples, 
respectively. The table structure is the same as in Table 3. In both subsamples, insider silence is 
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associated with significant negative future returns, which are significantly worse than when 
insiders net sell.
17
 Thus these results support the jeopardy hypothesis both before and after SOX. 
[Insert Table 11 about here] 
6.5. Database quality 
In our analysis we define ―insider silence‖ if we do not observe any insider trading 
activity as recorded in the database. The validity of this definition depends on the quality of the 
database, Thomson Reuters. At least two other possibilities can lead to observing no insider 
trading. First, insiders have traded but failed to report to the SEC or the SEC’s record of insider 
trades is incomplete.
18
 Thus, a researcher could mistakenly allocate some cases to the ―silence‖ 
portfolio while they actually belong to the ―buy‖ or ―sell‖ portfolio. If these unfiled or 
unrecorded trades are not driven by private information, the incompleteness of the database 
simply adds random noise to the data and works against hypothesis testing. 
Second, insiders have traded on private information but decided not to report to the SEC 
due to fear of regulatory and legal action. Seyhun and Bradley (1997, p. 200) discuss this 
possibility on a sample of firms that filed bankruptcy. Meulbroek (1992) examines episodes of 
illegal insider trading. Without a full list of such illegal insider trading we cannot distinguish 
whether our ―insider silence‖ cases are due to insiders having not traded on information or 
insiders having traded on information but having hidden the trades from regulators. Either way, 
however, the observed insider silence is consistent with our jeopardy hypothesis that insiders do 
not want regulators to know that they have traded on material, nonpublic information.  
Third, insiders might have never owned any shares. Thus, these firms are always 
classified into our ―silence‖ portfolio. If these cases are just random noise they would only work 
against our hypothesis testing. These cases, however, can be endogenously related to extremely 
negative future performance. For firms that have extremely negative prospect, using equity as 
part of the executive compensation probably will not provide effective incentives. One simple 
                                                          
17
 Nuances exist between the two subsamples. The ―silence‖ portfolio for the after-SOX subsample experiences less 
extreme negative returns than for the before-SOX subsample. Conversely, the ―sell‖ portfolio for the after-SOX 
subsample is associated with statistically significant future returns (about 3% over a year), whereas this pattern is 
much weaker before SOX. The result appears to be consistent with Jagolinzer (2009) that insiders strategically sell 
before negative news under SEC’s rule 10b5-1.  In addition, we estimate a regression as in Model 5 in Table 9 on 
the subsamples before and after SOX and find that the coefficients on silence are significant in both subsamples. 
18
 Our insider trading data is made available through Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS). The WRDS web 
(See http://wrds-web.wharton.upenn.edu/wrds/ds/tfn/index.cfm) has the following description of the database: ―The 
Insider Filing Data Feed (IFDF) is designed to capture all U.S. insider activity as reported on Forms 3, 4, 5, and 144 
in line-by-line detail.‖  
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example makes the point clear. Consider a manager awarded equity as part of the compensation 
and she knows that the stock price will significantly drop in the future. Assume no other 
restrictions on these shares. Would she sell? Bearing in mind the negative private information 
and the concern about legal jeopardy, she would not. Thus, the ex-ante value of equity 
compensation in such firms is essentially zero.  
The above discussion has implications for a very special subset of our sample. For about 
2.4% of our sample firm/months, the Thomson Reuters insider trading database covers no single 
record over the entire period of 1986-2011. Among the average 207 stocks in the ―silence‖ 
portfolio we examine in Panel B of Table 3, on average 24 stocks belong to this special group. 
Unreported analysis indicates that our main conclusion still holds after excluding these 24 stocks. 
For example, the one-year BHAR of the ―silence‖ portfolio (now average portfolio size of 183) 
is a significant -5.50%, and it is significantly lower than that of the ―sell‖ portfolio. Thus these 
special cases do not drive our main result. The average 24 stocks are not random noise though, as 
the portfolio of these stocks experiences a significant one-year BHAR of -30.15%. These special 
cases are best interpreted in light of endogenous compensation. 
6.6. Other robustness  
We conduct numerous robustness checks on the main result in Panel B of Table 3. We 
vary the time window over which we measure insider trading activity (from 3, 6, to 12 months); 
we measure insider activity based on the transaction dates instead of reporting dates; we use a 
simple measure of cumulative abnormal returns instead of BHAR. In general, our main result is 
remarkably robust. The main result also holds when we use the top decile or the top three deciles 
of short interest to form the sample. Further, splitting the ―sell‖ portfolio into ―heavy sell‖ and 
―light sell‖ portfolios does not yield any new insight: both portfolios experience mild negative 
returns, both outperform the ―silence‖ portfolio, and the difference between the two is not 
economically significant. 
7. Conclusion  
In this paper we examine the frequent phenomenon of insider silence. That is, when 
corporate insiders do not trade. We propose a jeopardy hypothesis, which posits that corporate 
insiders, due to fear of regulatory and legal action abstain from trading on extreme information, 
implying that insider silence can be associated with extreme future returns.  
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We find strong evidence supporting the jeopardy hypothesis. First, for a sample of 
merger targets, we find that insiders refrain from buying in the months before the announcement 
of the merger offer. For a sample of bankruptcy firms, insiders start to refrain from selling long 
before the month of bankruptcy filing. Second, using short interest to distinguish firms with 
positive information from those with negative information, we find more results that relate 
insider silence to future extreme returns, particularly when the information is negative. 
Specifically, among the heavily shorted stocks, insider silence predicts significant negative 
returns, which are even lower than when insiders net sell. The negative information is only 
gradually incorporated into stock prices and a significant portion of it is released surrounding the 
earnings announcements. The evidence suggests that insider silence is associated with price 
inefficiency. Using a list of proxies for limits to arbitrage and information uncertainty, we find 
that the price inefficiency of insider silence is pervasive and market frictions make it even worse. 
The paper sheds light on how insider trading regulations are related to price efficiency. 
Our evidence indicates that regulations distort the flow of insider information, which in turn 
reduces price efficiency.   
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Table 1: Summary statistics  
 
NID Silence  Buy  Sell  Mean 
Std.  
Dev. P5 P25 P50 P75 P95 
1 m 74.1% 7.6% 18.4% –0.093 0.260 –0.548 –0.099 –0.018 0.002 0.099 
3 m 49.4% 15.5% 35.1% –0.150 0.403 –0.906 –0.166 –0.027 0.004 0.157 
6 m 32.9% 20.5% 46.6% –0.241 0.624 –1.391 –0.279 –0.046 0.007 0.237 
12 m 19.5% 23.8% 56.7% –0.440 1.078 –2.445 –0.531 –0.095 0.010 0.406 
 
For each firm, net insider demand (NID) of time t is defined as the number of shares that insiders 
buy minus the number of shares that insiders sell, normalized by the total number of shares 
outstanding at the end of time t. Each row in the table presents summary statistics of NID 
measured over the past 1, 3, 6, or 12 months, respectively. Silence, buy, and sell are the 
percentage of firms whose insiders keep silent, net buy, and net sell, respectively, over the past 
time period listed in the first column. The summary statistics are calculated using a pooled 
sample over the period from 227 cross–sections (February 1992 to December 2010) with an 
average cross–section size of 3,895. 
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Table 2: Cumulative abnormal returns, insider buying and selling in merger targets 
Months AR p–value CAR Buy Sell 
–24 0.3% 0.197 0.3% 9.6% 19.7% 
–23 0.5% 0.041 0.8% 9.8% 19.7% 
–22 0.4% 0.128 1.2% 10.0% 18.8% 
–21 0.2% 0.385 1.4% 8.9% 19.0% 
–20 0.3% 0.137 1.8% 9.5% 20.1% 
–19 0.4% 0.118 2.2% 9.7% 19.0% 
–18 0.6% 0.008 2.8% 9.5% 19.8% 
–17 0.0% 0.938 2.8% 9.4% 19.7% 
–16 0.0% 0.886 2.8% 9.0% 19.8% 
–15 0.5% 0.042 3.3% 8.4% 20.1% 
–14 0.1% 0.555 3.5% 8.8% 19.9% 
–13 –0.2% 0.399 3.3% 9.0% 18.7% 
–12 0.5% 0.245 3.7% 8.7% 19.7% 
–11 –0.1% 0.618 3.6% 9.0% 19.1% 
–10 –0.2% 0.375 3.4% 8.4% 18.4% 
–9 –0.1% 0.721 3.3% 8.5% 18.8% 
–8 0.1% 0.638 3.5% 8.9% 19.5% 
–7 –0.2% 0.488 3.3% 8.4% 18.4% 
–6 –0.7% 0.002 2.6% 8.6% 18.3% 
–5 –0.6% 0.007 1.9% 7.7% 18.5% 
–4 0.1% 0.586 2.1% 6.1% 16.7% 
–3 0.5% 0.055 2.5% 6.2% 15.4% 
–2 0.6% 0.014 3.1% 5.5% 14.1% 
–1 2.9% 0.000 6.0% 3.5% 10.4% 
0 25.2% 0.000 31.2% 2.9% 11.4% 
1 0.3% 0.196 31.5% 2.0% 11.8% 
2 0.1% 0.768 31.5% 2.1% 11.8% 
3 0.0% 0.968 31.5% 2.3% 12.1% 
4 0.6% 0.020 32.1% 2.7% 13.3% 
5 –0.2% 0.410 31.8% 3.2% 13.5% 
6 –0.5% 0.184 31.4% 4.4% 11.9% 
7 –0.2% 0.591 31.2% 5.1% 12.9% 
8 0.3% 0.525 31.5% 5.4% 14.1% 
9 0.0% 0.981 31.5% 8.0% 14.4% 
10 1.0% 0.110 32.5% 7.4% 14.7% 
11 0.6% 0.327 33.1% 6.0% 14.6% 
12 –1.2% 0.046 31.8% 7.5% 12.2% 
 
The sample includes 4,267 targets involved in merger deals announced during 1992–2010. The 
first column represents the months relative to the announcement month, which is set to month 0. 
Column ―AR‖ is the average abnormal return for the month; ―p–value‖ is the p–value testing the 
statistical significance of the average abnormal return based on two–tailed t–tests; ―CAR‖ is the 
cumulative abnormal return; the ―Buy‖ (―Sell‖) column is the proportion of targets whose 
insiders net buy (sell) during the month.  
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Table 3: Insider silence and future returns 
 
Portfolios Average portfolio N 
Holding period 
1 m 3 m 6 m 12 m 24 m 
       Panel A: BHAR (in %) for whole sample 
Silence 1253 –0.35a –0.94a –1.71a –2.29a –3.69b 
Buy 823 0.22
a
 0.28 0.32 1.23 1.45 
Sell 1819 –0.10 –0.30 –0.46 –0.31 0.11 
  
      Buy–Sell 
 
0.33
a
 0.58
b
 0.77 1.54 1.34 
  
[3.01] [2.18] [1.51] [1.63] [1.02] 
Silence–Sell 
 
–0.24a –0.64a –1.25a –1.98b –3.80b 
  
[–3.55] [–3.60] [–3.48] [–2.40] [–2.14] 
Panel B: BHAR (in %) for high SI 
Silence 207 –0.85a –2.46a –4.60a –7.30a –10.90a 
Buy 132 –0.03 –0.41 –0.87 0.30 1.55 
Sell 440 –0.42a –0.97a –1.35b –1.43 –0.55 
  
      Buy–Sell 
 
0.39
b
 0.56 0.48 1.74 2.10 
  
[2.12] [1.27] [0.55] [1.17] [1.14] 
Silence–Sell 
 
–0.43a –1.48a –3.26a –5.87a –10.35a 
  
[–3.01] [–4.31] [–4.96] [–4.68] [–4.64] 
Panel C: BHAR (in %) for low SI 
Silence 350 –0.22 –0.46 –0.87 –0.71 –0.41 
Buy 225 0.02 –0.22 –0.50 –0.44 –1.68 
Sell 204 –0.13 –0.64 –0.98 –1.58 –2.40 
  
      Buy–Sell 
 
0.15 0.41 0.48 1.14 0.72 
  
[1.37] [1.53] [1.00] [1.25] [0.47] 
Silence–Buy 
 
–0.24b –0.24 –0.38 –0.27 1.27 
  
[–2.43] [–0.95] [–0.77] [–0.23] [0.46] 
 
Every month from January 1992 to December 2010, we sort firms into short interest quintiles. 
Panel A uses all the firms, whereas panels B and C only use the top and bottom quintiles, 
respectively. Within the chosen subsample, we form portfolios based on insider trading activity 
over the prior six months: the ―silence‖ portfolio contains firms with no insider trading; ―buy‖ 
represents firms whose insiders net buy; ―sell‖ represents firms whose insiders net sell. For each 
portfolio, we calculate its buy–and–hold abnormal return (BHAR, in %) over the subsequent 1, 
3, 6, 12, and 24 months. For the 24–month case, we use the sample from January 1992 to 
December 2009. The construction of BHAR is described in Appendix B. Each panel presents the 
time–series average BHAR for each portfolio and the spread between the portfolios. Tests of 
average BHARs and their spreads are based on Newey–West standard errors. Newey–West 
adjusted t–statistics for the spreads are reported in brackets. The second column reports average 
portfolio sizes. 
a
, 
b
, and 
c
 denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 4: The length of insider silence and future returns  
 
Portfolios 
Average 
portfolio N 
Holding period 
1 m 3 m 6 m 12 m 24 m 
       
Silence for 1 month 200 –0.45a –0.92a –1.12b –0.79 –0.01 
Silence for 3 months 127 –0.25 –0.63c –1.64a –1.72 –2.29 
Silence for 6 months 91 –0.38b –1.24a –2.53a –3.52a –4.73c 
Silence for 12 months 106 –1.16a –3.18a –5.98a –9.95a –15.30a 
  
      12m – 1m 
 
–0.71a –2.26a –4.86a –9.16a –15.29a 
  
 
[–3.37] [–4.31] [–5.01] [–5.45] [–4.03] 
 
Every month from January 1992 to December 2010, we sort firms into short interest quintiles. 
Among firms within the top short interest quintile, we form portfolios based on the length of 
time that insiders do not trade over the prior year. Firms whose insiders do not trade over the 
recent month but have traded prior to that month form the portfolio ―Silence for 1 month.‖ Firms 
whose insiders do not trade over the previous three months but have traded prior to that time 
form the portfolio ―Silence for 3 months.‖ Firms whose insiders do not trade over the recent six 
months but have traded prior to that time form the portfolio ―Silence for 6 months.‖ Firms whose 
insiders do not trade over the recent 12 months form the portfolio ―Silence for 12 months.‖ Each 
row shows the time–series average buy–and–hold abnormal return (BHAR, in %) over the 
subsequent 1, 3, 6, 12, and 24 months following portfolio formation. For the 24–month case, we 
use the sample from January 1992 to December 2009. The construction of BHAR is described in 
Appendix B. The last two rows report the return difference between the two extreme portfolios 
and the t–statistics associated with that difference. Tests of average BHARs and their differences 
are based on Newey–West standard errors. The second column reports average portfolio sizes. a, 
b
, and 
c
 denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 5: Monthly Fama–French–Carhart alpha 
 
Portfolios 
Month following portfolio formation 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
 
Panel A: Equal–weight portfolio alpha (%) 
Silence –0.96a –0.78a –0.67a –0.63a –0.64a –0.64a –0.56a –0.53a –0.43b –0.31 –0.21 –0.27 
Buy 0.01 0.11 –0.03 0.12 0.07 0.13 0.10 0.12 0.14 0.04 0.02 0.02 
Sell –0.45a –0.27b –0.21c –0.08 0.04 0.09 0.07 0.11 0.12 0.18 0.18 0.13 
             
Buy–Sell 0.47a 0.38b 0.18 0.20 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.02 –0.14 –0.16 –0.11 
Silence–Sell –0.51a –0.50a –0.46a –0.55a –0.68a –0.73a –0.63a –0.64a –0.55a –0.48a –0.39b –0.40b 
 
Panel B: Value–weight portfolio alpha (%) 
Silence –0.52a –0.32c –0.21 –0.39b –0.49a –0.42b –0.36b –0.39b –0.30c –0.43b –0.32c –0.19 
Buy –0.21 –0.07 0.08 –0.11 –0.21 –0.23 0.06 0.21 0.10 –0.02 0.18 0.18 
Sell –0.31b –0.17 –0.19 –0.05 0.12 0.14 0.11 0.08 0.16 0.09 0.15 0.10 
             
Buy–Sell 0.11 0.10 0.27 –0.05 –0.33c –0.37c –0.06 0.13 –0.06 –0.11 0.03 0.08 
Silence–Sell –0.21 –0.14 –0.01 –0.33c –0.61a –0.57a –0.48a –0.47a –0.46b –0.53a –0.47b –0.29 
 
Every month from January 1992 to December 2010, we sort firms into short interest quintiles. Firms within the top short interest 
quintile are formed into ―silence,‖ ―buy,‖ and ―sell‖ portfolios according to their net insider demand over the past six months. Firms 
that have positive (negative; missing) net insider demand form the ―buy‖ (―sell;‖ ―silence‖) portfolio. We calculate both equal–weight 
(panel A) and value–weight (Panel B) monthly returns for every month during the 12 months following the formation of these insider 
trading portfolios, and then regress portfolio excess returns on the Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997) four factors. The 
panels present the portfolio alphas (in %) and the spread in alphas between the portfolios. 
a
, 
b
, and 
c
 denote statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.   
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Table 6: Earnings announcement returns following portfolio formation 
Panel A: Earnings announcement returns  
Portfolios  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
             Silence –0.31b –0.34b –0.46a –0.59a –0.52a –0.43a –0.40a –0.32b –0.17 –0.14 –0.10 –0.17 
Buy –0.25 –0.22 –0.22 –0.14 –0.01 –0.02 –0.14 –0.24 –0.08 0.02 –0.12 –0.30c 
Sell –0.12 –0.06 –0.05 0.00 0.02 –0.04 –0.07 –0.06 –0.09 –0.09 0.04 0.03 
  
            Buy–Sell –0.13 –0.17 –0.17 –0.14 –0.03 0.02 –0.07 –0.17 0.01 0.11 –0.16 –0.34c 
 
[–0.67] [–0.70] [–0.84] [–0.69] [–0.15] [0.10] [–0.38] [–0.99] [0.07] [0.68] [–0.99] [–1.84] 
Silence–Buy –0.04 –0.11 –0.24 –0.45c –0.51b –0.41c –0.27 –0.12 –0.09 –0.16 0.02 0.13 
 
[–0.18] [–0.43] [–1.02] [–1.92] [–2.36] [–1.79] [–1.25] [–0.58] [–0.43] [–0.85] [0.12] [0.54] 
Silence–Sell –0.18 –0.28b –0.41a –0.59a –0.54a –0.39b –0.34b –0.25c –0.08 –0.05 –0.14 –0.21 
 
[–1.30] [–2.15] [–2.97] [–4.06] [–3.65] [–2.55] [–2.30] [–1.77] [–0.53] [–0.36] [–1.00] [–1.33] 
 
Panel B: The ratio of earnings announcement returns to monthly alphas for the ―silence‖ portfolio 
Month  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
             Ratio (%) 32 43 68 93 80 68 72 60 40 44 47 64
 
In Panel A, every month from January 1992 to December 2010 we sort firms into short interest quintiles. Firms within the top short 
interest quintile are formed into ―silence,‖ ―buy,‖ and ―sell‖ portfolios according to their net insider demand over the past six months. 
Firms that have positive (negative; missing) net insider demand form the ―buy‖ (―sell;‖ ―silence‖) portfolio. Following portfolio 
formation, we collect the firms’ earnings announcement dates from the Compustat quarterly file and calculate their three–day [–1, +1] 
abnormal returns adjusted by CRSP equal–weight market returns. The table presents, for each of the three portfolios, the equal–weight 
average of the earnings–announcement period abnormal returns (in %) in every month of the 12 months following portfolio formation. 
The table also presents the average return spread between the portfolios with their t–statistics shown in square brackets. a, b, and c 
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Panel B shows, for the ―silence‖ portfolio only, the ratio of 
the earnings announcement returns to the monthly alphas (see Table 5 Panel A) for each of the 12 months following portfolio 
formation.  
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Table 7: Insider silence and market frictions 
 
 
Silence 
[1] 
Sell 
[2] 
D1 = 
[1] – [2] 
 
Silence 
[4] 
Sell 
[5] 
D2 = 
[4] – [5]   
T 
([1] – [4]) 
Panel A: Firm size 
  
Small 
   
Large 
    1 –1.00a –0.61a (–0.39)b 
 
–0.55a –0.29b (–0.27)c  [–2.45]b 
 3 –3.14a –1.61a (–1.53)a 
 
–1.17a –0.54 (–0.63)c  [–4.75]a 
 6 –5.91a –2.69a (–3.21)a 
 
–2.12a –0.41 (–1.71)b  [–5.31]a 
12 –9.25a –3.83a (–5.42)a 
 
–3.64a 0.27 (–3.91)a  [–5.00]a 
Panel B: Institutional ownership 
  
Low 
   
High 
    1 –1.13a –0.71a (–0.42)b 
 
–0.42b –0.20 (–0.22)  [–3.71]a 
 3 –3.47a –1.86a (–1.61)a 
 
–0.93a –0.27 (–0.65)c  [–6.80]a 
 6 –6.41a –2.99a (–3.41)a 
 
–1.97a –0.00 (–1.96)a  [–6.64]a 
12 –9.86a –3.88b (–5.98)a 
 
–3.53a 0.57 (–4.10)a  [–5.36]a 
Panel C: Number of institutions 
  
Few 
   
Many 
    1 –1.11a –0.72a (–0.39)b 
 
–0.37b –0.21c (–0.16)  [–4.02]a 
 3 –3.36a –1.85a (–1.51)a 
 
–0.82b –0.35 (–0.47)  [–6.74]a 
 6 –6.05a –3.22a (–2.83)a 
 
–1.97b 0.00 (–1.97)a  [–5.06]a 
12 –9.60a –4.78a (–4.82)a 
 
–3.17b 0.99 (–4.16)a  [–4.77]a 
Panel D: Number of analysts 
  
Few 
   
Many 
    1 –1.11a –0.69a (–0.43)b 
 
–0.37c –0.18 (–0.20)  [–3.77]a 
 3 –3.19a –1.59a (–1.60)a 
 
–1.26a –0.42 (–0.84)b  [–4.57]a 
 6 –5.73a –2.43a (–3.30)a 
 
–2.79a –0.42 (–2.37)a  [–4.04]a 
12 –9.58a –3.69a (–5.89)a 
 
–3.68a 0.37 (–4.06)a  [–4.25]a 
Panel E: Firm age 
  
Young 
   
Old 
    1 –1.15a –0.67a (–0.47)b 
 
–0.54a –0.17 (–0.37)b  [–2.85]a 
 3 –3.45a –1.69a (–1.76)a 
 
–1.41a –0.27 (–1.14)a  [–3.92]a 
 6 –6.37a –2.60a (–3.76)a 
 
–2.71a –0.11 (–2.61)a  [–3.99]a 
12 –9.96a –3.35b (–6.61)a 
 
–4.42a 0.45 (–4.88)a  [–4.08]a 
Panel F: Idiosyncratic volatility 
  
High 
   
Low 
    1 –1.03a –0.73a (–0.29) 
 
–0.29a –0.13 (–0.17)  [–2.48]b 
 3 –3.52a –1.71a (–1.81)a 
 
–0.74a –0.27 (–0.46)  [–4.24]a 
 6 –6.42a –2.43b (–3.98)a 
 
–1.98a –0.29 (–1.69)a  [–3.76]a 
12 –9.95a –2.62 (–7.33)a 
 
–3.81a –0.19 (–3.62)a  [–2.77]a 
Panel G: Total volatility 
  
High 
   
Low 
    1 –1.24a –0.66b (–0.58)a 
 
–0.35a –0.20c (–0.15)  [–2.94]a 
 3 –3.63a –1.31b (–2.32)a 
 
–0.91a –0.60c (–0.32)  [–3.76]a 
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 6 –6.48a –1.80 (–4.68)a 
 
–2.13a –0.81 (–1.31)b  [–3.34]a 
12 –9.73a –2.13 (–7.60)a 
 
–4.20a –0.63 (–3.56)a  [–2.48]b 
Panel H: Amihud illiquidity 
  
Low 
   
High 
    1 –0.99a –0.62a (–0.37)b 
 
–0.55a –0.29b (–0.26)  [–2.37]b 
 3 –3.06a –1.56a (–1.50)a 
 
–1.22a –0.59 (–0.63)c  [–4.21]a 
 6 –5.64a –2.60a (–3.04)a 
 
–2.51a –0.50 (–2.01)a  [–3.96]a 
12 –8.91a –3.85a (–5.05)a 
 
–4.19a 0.25 (–4.44)a  [–4.03]a 
Panel I: Amihud modified illiquidity 
  
Low 
   
High 
    1 –1.04a –0.58a (–0.46)a 
 
–0.60b –0.31b (–0.29)  [–1.91]c 
 3 –3.12a –1.48a (–1.64)a 
 
–1.56a –0.61 (–0.94)b  [–2.79]a 
 6 –5.80a –2.50a (–3.30)a 
 
–2.94a –0.49 (–2.45)a  [–2.55]b 
12 –9.18a –3.34b (–5.83)a 
 
–4.64b 0.04 (–4.69)a  [–2.05]b 
Panel J: Dollar volume 
  
Low 
   
High 
    1 –1.00a –0.50a (–0.51)a 
 
–0.58b –0.38b (–0.20)  [–1.82]c 
 3 –3.02a –1.33a (–1.69)a 
 
–1.48a –0.75c (–0.73)c  [–2.86]a 
 6 –5.53a –2.25a (–3.29)a 
 
–2.97a –0.74 (–2.23)a  [–2.47]b 
12 –8.57a –3.33b (–5.23)a 
 
–5.19a –0.10 (–5.09)a  [–1.99]b 
 
Every month from January 1992 to December 2010, we sort firms into short interest quintiles. 
Within firms in the top quintile, we sort firms into two equal groups according to one of the 10 
proxies for limits to arbitrage or information uncertainty (LTA/IU), as denoted in the title of each 
panel. Within each group, we form portfolios based on insider trading activity over the prior six 
months: the ―silence‖ portfolio contains firms with no insider trading, and ―sell‖ represents firms 
whose insiders net sell. For each portfolio, we calculate the buy–and–hold abnormal return 
(BHAR, in %) over the subsequent 1, 3, 6, and 12 months. Columns [1] and [2] and columns [4] 
and [5] present the time–series average BHAR for each portfolio; columns D1 and D2 report the 
spreads [1] – [2] and [4] – [6], respectively. The last column reports the t–statistics testing [1] – 
[4]. All tests are based on Newey–West standard errors. The LTA/IU variables are defined in 
Appendix A. 
a
, 
b
, and 
c
 denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 8: Insider silence, litigation risk, and future returns 
 
 
Silence 
[1] 
Sell 
[2] 
D1 = 
[1] – [2] 
 
Silence 
[4] 
Sell 
[5] 
D2 = 
[4] – [5]  
T 
([1] – [4]) 
Panel A: Litigation risk proxy is FPS 
  
Low  
   
High 
   1 –0.95a –0.57a (–0.38)b 
 
–0.47c –0.16 (–0.31)  [–1.82]c 
 3 –2.78a –1.50a (–1.28)a 
 
–1.35c –0.16 (–1.19)b  [–1.84]c 
 6 –5.20a –2.30a (–2.91)a 
 
–2.51c 0.04 (–2.55)a  [–1.74]c 
12 –8.29a –3.65a (–4.64)a 
 
–3.71 1.66 (–5.37)a  [–1.59] 
Panel B: Litigation risk proxy is KS 
  
Low 
   
High 
   1 –0.87a –0.64a (–0.23) 
 
–0.75a –0.36a (–0.39)b [–0.43] 
 3 –3.07a –2.07a (–0.99) 
 
–2.03a –0.77b (–1.26)a  [–1.86]c 
 6 –6.01a –3.84a (–2.17)c 
 
–3.73a –0.91c (–2.82)a  [–2.10]b 
12 –11.06a –6.63a (–4.42)b 
 
–5.43a –0.51 (–4.92)a  [–2.77]a 
 
Every month from January 1992 to December 2010, we sort firms into short interest quintiles. 
Within firms in the top quintile, we sort firms into two groups according to one of the two 
proxies for litigation risk, FPS and KS, which are defined in Appendix C. Within each group, we 
form portfolios based on insider trading activity over the prior six months: the ―silence‖ portfolio 
contains firms with no insider trading, and ―sell‖ represents firms whose insiders net sell. For 
each portfolio, we calculate the buy–and–hold abnormal return (BHAR, in %) over the 
subsequent 1, 3, 6, and 12 months. Columns [1] and [2] and columns [4] and [5] present the 
time–series average BHAR for each portfolio; columns D1 and D2 report the spreads [1] – [2] 
and [4] – [6], respectively. The last column reports the t–statistics testing [1] – [4]. All tests are 
based on Newey–West standard errors. a, b, and c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% confidence levels, respectively. 
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Table 9: BHAR, silence, other characteristics, and regressions 
Panel A: Summary statistics  
  Silence Buy Sell Silence – Sell Buy – Sell 
Short interest (%) 9.030 8.865 8.710 [0.320]
a
 [0.155]
a
 
Firm size 5.850 6.000 6.662 [–0.812]a [–0.661]a 
Book–to–market –0.828 –0.663 –1.120 [0.292]a [0.458]a 
Return momentum 0.045 –0.054 0.232 [–0.187]a [–0.286]a 
Institutional ownership (%) 44.908 48.246 53.701 [–8.792]a [–5.454]a 
Number of analysts 3.489 4.108 5.250 [–1.761]a [–1.143]a 
Age (yr) 14.821 15.716 13.856 [0.964]
a
 [1.860]
a
 
Lit. risk (FPS) 0.371 0.322 0.422 [–0.052]a [–0.100]a 
Lit. risk (KS) 0.743 0.759 0.868 [–0.124]a [–0.108]a 
New firm  0.156 0.145 0.149 [0.007]
a
 [–0.004] 
 
Panel B: Fama–MacBeth regressions 
Variables  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Silence –5.866 –5.641 –4.416 –4.287 –3.539 
 
(–4.68)a (–4.74)a (–3.45)a (–3.52)a (–3.16)a 
Buy 1.737 1.851 2.707 2.764 2.535 
 
(1.17) (1.24) (2.35)
b
 (2.40)
b
 (2.66)
a
 
Short interest 
 
–0.489 
 
–0.415 –0.435 
  
(–3.74)a 
 
(–2.73)a (–2.71)a 
Firm size 
  
1.600 1.405 –0.720 
   
(3.59)
a
 (2.97)
a
 (–0.85) 
Book–to–market 
  
–0.494 –0.715 –1.845 
   
(–0.48) (–0.68) (–1.86)c 
Return momentum 
  
0.397 0.292 1.513 
   
(0.14) (0.10) (0.63) 
Institutional ownership 
    
0.049 
     
(2.43)
b
 
Number of analysts 
    
0.309 
     
(2.41)
b
 
Idiosyncratic volatility 
    
–97.275 
     
(–1.12) 
Firm age 
    
–0.059 
     
(–1.76)c 
Amihud illiquidity 
    
–1.609 
     
(–2.59)b 
Dollar volume 
    
0.023 
     
(0.67) 
Lit. risk (KS) 
    
2.142 
     
(1.23) 
New firm 
    
–4.470 
     
(–2.56)b 
Intercept –1.434 2.362 –14.392 –10.324 1.114 
 
(–1.08) (1.16) (–3.94)a (–2.30)b (0.20) 
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Avg. N 779 779 742 742 705 
Avg. adj. R2 0.005 0.007 0.021 0.023 0.045 
 
Every month from January 1992 to December 2010 we sort firms into short interest quintiles. 
Firms within the top short interest quintile are formed into ―silence,‖ ―buy,‖ and ―sell‖ portfolios 
according to their net insider demand over the past six months. Firms that have positive 
(negative; missing) net insider demand form the ―buy‖ (―sell;‖ ―silence‖) portfolio. Panel A 
presents the mean values of firm characteristics for the ―silence,‖ ―buy,‖ and ―sell‖ portfolios and 
the differences among them. Panel B present the Fama–MacBeth cross–sectional regression 
results. Every month we regress buy–and–hold abnormal returns (defined in Appendix B) over 
the subsequent 12 months on insider silence, buy, and other control variables. Silence is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if insiders of the firm do not trade over the past six months; buy is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if insiders of the firm buy in net over the past six months; book–to–
market ratio is the natural logarithm of the ratio of book value of equity (CEQQ), and market 
value of equity (PRCCQ *CSHOQ); return momentum is the cumulated return over the past year 
excluding the most recent month; lit. risk (KS) is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the KS measure 
(in Appendix C) is above sample median; new firm is equal to one if the firm is younger than 
three years. All other variables are defined in Appendix A. Each column reports the time–series 
average of the cross–sectional regression coefficients. T–statistics are based on Newey–West 
standard errors. 
a
, 
b
, and 
c
 denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence 
levels, respectively. 
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Table 10: Insider heavy selling preceding a period of silence  
 
Portfolios 
Average  
portfolio N 
Holding period 
1 m 3 m 6 m 12 m 24 m 
   
     Heavy sell 33 –0.71a –2.17a –4.65a –7.42a –10.21a 
Others 164 –0.79a –2.32a –4.30a –6.72a –10.27a 
       
Others – Heavy sell  –0.08 –0.14 0.34 0.70 –0.06 
 
 [–0.31] [–0.29] [0.40] [0.46] [–0.03] 
 
Every month from January 1992 to December 2010, we form sample firms in the top short 
interest quintile whose insiders have not traded during the past six months (from months –6 to –1 
relative to the month to form portfolios). We then examine their insider trading activity over the 
preceding six months period (from months –12 to –7) and form two portfolios: ―Heavy sell‖ and 
―Others.‖ The portfolio ―Heavy sell‖ consists of the lower half of those whose insiders net sell 
during months –12 to –7. The remaining stocks form the portfolio ―Others.‖ For each portfolio, 
we calculate their buy–and–hold abnormal return (BHAR, in %) over the subsequent 1, 3, 6, 12, 
and 24 months. For the 24–month holding period, we use the sample ending in December 2009. 
The construction of BHAR is described in Appendix B. The table presents the time–series 
average BHARs for each of the portfolios and the spread between the two. Tests of average 
BHARs and the spread between the two portfolios are based on Newey–West standard errors. a, 
b
, and 
c
 denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence levels, respectively. 
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Table 11: Insider silence before and after the Sarbanes–Oxley Act 
 
Portfolios Average portfolio N 
Holding period 
1 m 3 m 6 m 12 m 24 m 
 
Panel A: Before SOX 
Silence 255 –1.11a –3.11a –5.30a –8.05a –12.10a 
Buy 146 –0.11 –0.57 –1.12 0.94 2.56 
Sell 429 –0.40b –0.85c –0.89 –0.26 1.73 
  
      Buy–Sell 
 
0.29 0.28 –0.23 1.20 0.84 
  
[1.43] [0.51] [–0.21] [0.70] [0.42] 
Silence–Sell 
 
–0.70a –2.27a –4.41a –7.80a –13.83a 
  
[–4.26] [–5.49] [–5.21] [–4.47] [–5.14] 
Panel B: After SOX 
Silence 146 –0.51b –1.63a –3.72a –6.34a –9.18a 
Buy 115 0.08 –0.22 –0.55 –0.51 0.11 
Sell 455 –0.44a –1.14a –1.93a –2.93a –3.80c 
  
      Buy–Sell 
 
0.52 0.92 1.38 2.42 3.91 
  
[1.58] [1.26] [0.99] [0.95] [1.26] 
Silence–Sell 
 
–0.07 –0.49 –1.79b –3.41a –5.38a 
  
[–0.30] [–0.92] [–1.99] [–2.63] [–3.77] 
 
Every month from January 1992 to December 2010, we sort firms into short interest quintiles 
and keep only the stocks in the top quintile. Panel A is based on the sample from January 1992 to 
August 2002 and Panel B is based on the sample from September 2002 to December 2010. For 
firms in the top short interest quintile, we form portfolios based on insider trading activity over 
the prior six months: the ―silence‖ portfolio contains firms with no insider trading; ―buy‖ 
represents firms whose insiders net buy; ―sell‖ represents firms whose insiders net sell. For each 
portfolio, we calculate their buy–and–hold abnormal return (BHAR, in %) over the subsequent 1, 
3, 6, 12, and 24 months. For the 24–month case, we use the sample ending in December 2009. 
The construction of BHAR is described in Appendix B. Each panel presents the time–series 
average BHAR for each portfolio and the spreads between the portfolios. Tests of average 
BHARs and their spreads are based on Newey–West standard errors. Newey–West adjusted t–
statistics for the spreads are reported in brackets. The second column reports average portfolio 
sizes. 
a
, 
b
, and 
c
 denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence levels, 
respectively. 
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Figure 1: Proportion of firms whose insiders net sell, net buy, and keep silence  
Panel A: Proportion by month  
 
Panel B: Proportion by short interest deciles  
 
For every month from February 1992 to December 2010, Panel A presents the proportion of 
firms whose insiders net buy (―Buy‖), net sell (―Sell‖), or keep silent (―Silence‖) over the trailing 
six months. Panel B presents the time–series average of the proportions by short interest deciles.   
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Figure 2:  
Cumulative abnormal returns and insider net buying in merger targets 
 
 
 
The sample includes 4,267 targets involved in merger deals announced during 1992–2010. 
Month 0 is the announcement month. The graph shows the proportions of targets whose insiders 
buy in net (Buy) from 24 months before to 12 months after the announcement. The thick solid 
line draws the cumulative abnormal returns.  
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Figure 3:  
Cumulative abnormal returns and insider net selling in bankruptcy firms 
 
 
 
The sample consists of 524 firms that filed bankruptcy during 1992–2010. Month 0 is the filing 
month. The dashed line shows the proportions of bankruptcy firms whose insiders sell in net 
(Sell) from 60 months before to 12 months after the announcement; the thin solid line draws the 
6–month moving average of this proportion (Sell_MovAvg6); the thick solid line draws the 
cumulative abnormal returns (CAR). The ―CAR‖ series use the left scale, and the ―Sell‖ and 
―Sell_MovAvg6‖ series use the right scale.  
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Figure 4:  
Insider buying, selling, silence, and future returns when insiders possess negative information  
 
 
 
Every month from January 1992 to December 2010, we sort firms into short interest quintiles. 
Within the top quintile, we form portfolios based on insider trading activity over the prior six 
months: the ―silence‖ portfolio contains firms with no insider trading; ―buy‖ represents firms 
whose insiders net buy; ―sell‖ represents firms whose insiders net sell. For each portfolio, we 
calculate the buy–and–hold abnormal return (BHAR, in %) over the subsequent one to 12 
months. The construction of BHAR is described in Appendix B. The graph plots the time–series 
average BHAR for each portfolio. The average portfolio size is shown in parentheses.   
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Figure 5:  
Length of silence and future returns 
 
 
 
Every month from January 1992 to December 2010, we sort firms into short interest quintiles. 
Among firms within the top short interest quintile, we form portfolios based on the length of 
time insiders do not trade over the prior year. Firms whose insiders do not trade over the recent 
month but have traded prior to that month form the portfolio ―Silence for 1 month.‖ Firms whose 
insiders do not trade over the recent three months but have traded prior to that period form the 
portfolio ―Silence for 3 months.‖ Firms whose insiders do not trade over the recent six months 
but have traded prior to that period form the portfolio ―Silence for 6 months.‖ Firms whose 
insiders do not trade over the recent 12 months form the portfolio ―Silence for 12 months.‖ The 
lines plot the time–series average buy–and–hold abnormal returns (BHAR, in %) over the 
subsequent one to 12 months following portfolio formation. The construction of BHAR is 
described in Appendix B. 
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Figure 6: Monthly Fama–French–Carhart alphas  
Panel A: Equal–weight portfolio alpha (in %) 
 
Panel B: Value–weight portfolio alpha (in %) 
 
 
Every month from January 1992 to December 2010, we sort firms into short interest quintiles. 
Firms within the top quintile are sorted into portfolios based on their net insider demand over the 
past six months. Firms that have positive (negative; missing) net insider demand form the ―buy‖ 
(―sell;‖ ―silence‖) portfolio. We then form equal– (panel A) and value–weight (Panel B) monthly 
return portfolios for every month during the 12 months following portfolio formation and regress 
the portfolio excess return on the Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997) four–factors. 
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Figure 7: Earnings announcement returns (%) 
 
 
 
Every month from January 1992 to December 2010, we sort firms into short interest quintiles. 
Firms within the top quintile are formed into ―silence,‖ ―buy,‖ and ―sell‖ portfolios according to 
their net insider demand over the past six months. Firms with positive (negative; missing) net 
insider demand form the ―buy‖ (―sell;‖ ‖silence‖) portfolio. Following portfolio formation, we 
collect the earnings announcement dates from the Compustat quarterly file and calculate their 
three–day [–1, +1] abnormal returns adjusted by CRSP equal–weight market returns. The figure 
plots, for each of the three portfolios, the equal–weight average earnings announcement 
abnormal returns (in %) in each of the 12 months following portfolio formation.   
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Appendix A: Variable definitions  
 
Main variables   
Net insider demand Net insider demand of time t is defined as the number of 
shares that insiders buy minus the number of shares that 
insiders sell, normalized by the total number of shares 
outstanding at the end of time t. 
Short interest Short interest in shares divided by the number of shares 
outstanding, measured at the prior month end.  
LTA/IU variables  
Amihud illiquidity Ratio of absolute daily return to daily dollar volume 
averaged over the past three months.  
Amihud modified illiquidity Ratio of difference between daily high and low price to daily 
dollar volume averaged over the past three months.  
Dollar trading volume Average daily dollar volume over the past three months. 
Firm age Number of months since first appearing on CRSP. 
Firm size The market capitalization measured at the prior month end in 
$million, then take natural logarithm. 
Idiosyncratic volatility Weekly return standard deviation over the past 52 weeks. 
Institutional ownership The percentage owned by institutional shareholders as of the 
most recent quarter end. Data from Thomson Financial 
13f. 
Number of analysts Number of analysts following the stock as of the most recent 
month end. Data from I/B/E/S. Missing value is set to 
zero. 
Number of institutional owners The number of institutional shareholders as of the most 
recent quarter end. Data from Thomson Financial 13f. 
Total volatility Standard deviation of residuals from regression of weekly 
stock return on weekly market return over the past 52 
weeks.  
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Appendix B: Construction of buy–and–hold abnormal return (BHAR) 
 
We construct buy–and–hold abnormal return (BHAR) in a way similar to the recent literature 
(e.g., Lakonishok and Lee 2001; Sias and Whidbee, 2010). Specifically, at the end of June of 
year t, we independently form NYSE size and book–to–market (B/M) quintiles to extract the 
breakpoint values, and assign AMEX and NASDAQ stocks to the 5 x 5 portfolios according to 
their size and B/M values. The equal–weight portfolio return serves as the benchmark return for 
the stock in the same size and B/M portfolio for the months starting from July of year t to June of 
year t+1. Portfolio assignment is rebalanced every year. BHAR for stock j is defined as the buy–
and–hold raw return of stock j minus the buy–and–hold benchmark portfolio return. If a stock is 
delisted before the holding period, returns of the months after delisting are replaced with the 
benchmark portfolio returns. The delisting return is used for the delisting month. We calculate 
BHAR for all stocks/months over the holding period of one to 24 months.  
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Appendix C: Proxies for litigation risk 
 
Two proxies, FPS and KS, are defined here.  
 
The first proxy is FPS, which is defined as equal to 1 if the firm is in the biotech (SIC codes 
2833–2836 and 8731–8734), computer (3570–3577 and 7370–7374), electronics (3600–3674), or 
retail (5200–5961) industry, and 0 otherwise. 
 
The second proxy KS is based on Model 3 in Table 7 of Kim and Skinner (2012, page 302). 
KS =  
FPS * 0.566  
+ LNASSETS * 0.518  
+ SALES_GROWTH * 0.982  
+ RETURN * 0.379  
+ RETURN_SKEWNESS * (–0.108)  
+ RETURN_STDDEV * 25.635  
+ TURNOVER*0.00007/1000,  
where the right–hand–side variables are defined below. 
 
FPS: Defined above;  
LNASSETS: Natural log of total assets at the end of year t–1; 
SALES_GROWTH: Year t–1 sales less year t–2 sales scaled by beginning of year t–1 total 
assets; 
RETURN: Market–adjusted 12–month stock return. The accumulation period ends with year t–1 
fiscal year–end month; 
RETURN_SKEWNESS:  Skewness of the firm’s 12–month return for year t–1; 
RETURN_STDDEV: Standard deviation of the firm’s 12–month returns for year t–1; 
TURNOVER: Trading volume accumulated over the 12–month period ending with the fiscal 
year–end before year t–1 fiscal year–end month scaled by beginning of year t–1 shares 
outstanding. 
 
 
